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Abstract
Potential focusing events are sudden, relatively rare events that reveal harm, or the potential 
for harm, are known to policymakers and the public virtually simultaneously, and work harms 
on a definable geographic area or community of interest. Focusing events can provide a power-
ful symbol of government failure, thereby allowing previously ignored issues to advance on the 
government agenda. We revisit this conceptualization of focusing events within the context 
of the COVID-19 pandemic. We show that, while the current COVID-19 pandemic has had a 
profound effect on both the media and government agendas, it lacks many of the elements 
used to differentiate focusing events from other theoretical constructs used to describe public 
problems. Specifically, our findings suggest that focusing event theory is ill equipped to de-
scribe slow-onset, long-duration disasters such as COVID-19. We develop a new typology for 
characterizing these types of events, which accounts for both the duration of the event as well 
as the magnitude or scale of the event’s impact.
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Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic is one of the most significant public health crises in modern history, 
killing over 2 million people worldwide (Johns Hopkins, 2021). Unsurprisingly, a chorus of 
popular commentators has come to label it a “focusing event” capable of yielding broad social 
and political change across virtually every sector of society (Jenkins, 2020; Reville, 2020; Bur-
gess, 2020; Olshan, 2020; Zenko, 2020). Jeremy Olshan (2020) of MarketWatch writes: “Social 
scientists say a crisis like COVID-19 is a ‘focusing event’, one that recalibrates public policy and 
cultural norms. This collective focusing may not happen quickly enough.” Micah Zenko, Senior 
Fellow at Chatham House, writing in Foreign Policy, said “the virus offers a focusing event from 
which political leaders and government officials can have a (roughly) shared understanding of 
what happened, why it happened, who is accountable, and how can it be avoided”. And in his 
Boston Globe op-ed, Harvard Professor of Education Paul Reville (2020) calls the pandemic a 
“focusing event that has turned public attention to children and education”. 
This line of thinking has permeated academic publishing as well. A simple Google Scholar 
search unearths scores of peer-reviewed publications labelling the pandemic a focusing event. 
This research suggests that the pandemic has facilitated opportunities for policy change not 
only within the public health community (Hur & Kim, 2020), but in scores of other policy areas 
as well, including long-term care policy (Béland & Marier, 2020; Reynolds, 2020), labor and 
delivery policy (Monteblanco, 2021), education policy (Hoffman & Miller, 2020), immigration 
policy (Jakobson & Kalev, 2020), healthcare finance policy (Béland et al., 2020), and housing 
policy (Verhaeghe & Ghekiere, 2020). 
While few would object to calling COVID-19 a crisis, a closer reading of extant policy theory 
suggests that the current pandemic lacks many of the key features typically associated with 
potential focusing events. It was neither sudden nor unexpected by experts. It was not geo-
graphically isolated. And, to date, it is largely unclear whether the crisis will trigger the types of 
large-scale policy changes potentially associated with learning from focusing events (Birkland, 
1997, 1998). Complicating matters further, many of the crises explored in the focusing events 
literature tend to be time-bound disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, or technological 
accidents. By contrast, the COVID-19 pandemic is a slow-onset, long-duration phenomenon 
that has caused — and will continue to cause and reveal — harms over a long time. 
Within this context the following study assesses whether COVID-19 has the characteristics of 
a focusing event. We begin by reviewing the existing research on focusing events. Although the 
concept has been widely applied across the policy sciences, our analysis is grounded in Birk-
land’s (1997, 1998) conceptualization of potential focusing events, which focuses on agenda 
setting and policy change after man-made or naturally occurring disaster.  We use a mixed-
methods design to analyze the extent to which COVID-19 can be accurately characterized as a 
focusing event, its influence on the agenda of the United States Congress and the U.S. national 
media, and the extent to which the pandemic has induced policy change. We show that, while 
the current crisis has a profound effect on legislative and media agendas, it does not meet the 
classic definition of a focusing event, and therefore has different effects on agenda-setting and 
the development of policy solutions that are typically seen in event-driven policy. Nor has it 
yet sparked robust lesson-learning that can be applied to similar hazards in the future. We con-
clude by presenting a typology for characterizing the policymaking implications of slow-onset, 
long-duration events such as the COVID-19 pandemic. 
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Focusing Events and Policy Process Theory
The term “focusing event” was coined by John Kingdon in his 1984 book Agendas, Alterna-
tives, and Public Policy, which forms the foundation of the Multiple Stream Framework (MSF) 
of agenda setting and policy change. The MSF argues that the policy process contains three 
streams of activity, which, when coupled, create windows of opportunity for proponents of 
policy change to push their favored issues onto the crowded government agenda (Herweg et 
al., 2017). The policy stream includes policies presented as solutions to pressing social issues. 
The politics stream describes the partisan composition of government, interest-group prefer-
ences, and the national mood, which refers to the way in which elected officials perceive the 
preferences of the public.  Finally, the problem stream describes the various items vying for 
policymaker attention. 
Focusing events represent an important element of the problem stream, along with indicators 
and feedback. Indicators are statistics and other measures documenting changes in a prob-
lem. Feedback includes information generated through evaluations of existing government 
programs. But these aspects of policy problems are often insufficient to generate attention. 
Rather, Kingdon argues that “problems...need a little push to get the attention of people in 
and around government”. Pushes come in the form of a focusing event or a “crisis or disaster 
that comes along to call attention to the problem, a powerful symbol that catches on, or the 
personal experience of a policy maker” (2003, pp. 94-95). 
Focusing Events Defined
Kingdon’s definition of focusing events is imprecise, discursive, and inductive. Birkland (1997) 
clarifies the concept to make it more tractable to systematic study. He defines potential focus-
ing events as “sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the 
possibility of future harms, inflicts harms or suggests potential harms that are or could be 
concentrated on a definable geographical area or community of interest, and that is known to 
policy makers and the public virtually simultaneously” (Birkland, 1997, p. 22). This refinement 
allows us to measure the features of an event that makes it “focal,” such as the suddenness of 
the event, harms (e.g., injuries, deaths, property damage) from the event, and the scope of the 
disaster (e.g., population of the area affected or the size of the group affected by the event). 
Birkland’s emphasis on a potential event suggests that it is difficult to know a priori whether an 
event will have a great deal of focal power. 
By sharpening and clarifying the definition of a focusing event, Birkland’s theory offers an un-
derstanding of the concept that is more measurable but slightly narrower than the definitions 
offered by rival theories. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), for example, suggests that 
so-called “external shocks” encompass not only disasters, but other types of events as well, 
such as shifts in public opinion, or even deteriorating socioeconomic conditions (e.g., a reces-
sion) (Jones & Jenkins-Smith, 2009; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017; Nohrstedt, 2009). Punctu-
ated Equilibrium Theory (PET) has allowed for a fairly sweeping conceptualization of focusing 
events or exogenous shocks (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009), one which includes disasters as well 
as important social and political developments, such as important court rulings (Wood, 2006). 
Still, Birkland’s (1997) study remains the gold-standard among students of disaster policy, 
a testament to his careful operationalization and measurement of the concept. Existing ap-
plications have focused primarily on sudden-onset events, such as aviation security incidents 
(Birkland, 2004), flooding (O’Donovan, 2017; Albright & Crow, 2021), wildfires (Crow et al, 
2017), hurricanes (Roberts, 2009), and earthquakes (DeYoung & Penta, 2017). In contrast, 
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scholarship on emerging diseases, which gradually unfold over a period of weeks or months, 
has primarily focused on the role of indicators to initiate issue attention (DeLeo, 2018). Well 
before the COVID pandemic, Birkland (2006) used the avian influenza outbreak to highlight 
this distinction:
In 2005, for example, the problem of the H5N1 strain of bird flu influenza gained 
worldwide attention, and its transmission to humans in Turkey and Europe in early 
2006 has increased concern about pandemic flu, and in particular about the possibil-
ity of its transmission from person to person rather than from birds to people. But a 
global flu pandemic is a different kind of disaster from the type described in this book 
because it can be anticipated before the pandemic occurs (p.7). 
He adds that, in public health domains, “problems become known slowly, as indicators of prob-
lems accumulate and become more evident” (p. 7). This is not to say that public health matters 
do not come to occupy a great deal of the agenda; rather, that public health issues emerge on 
the agenda over time, not in an instant. Nor are we arguing that pandemics cannot emerge 
quickly; we are arguing that they do not emerge suddenly, in a way that causes the mass public 
and policy elites to come to the “alarmed discovery” (Downs, 1972) of a problem nearly simul-
taneously. 
With this in mind, there does not appear to be a bright line between focusing events and indi-
cators. Research suggests that, when indicators amass rapidly, providing little time for policy-
makers to engage in the type of pre-event preparedness typically associated with public health 
domains, events can bowl their way onto the government agenda in much the same way as a 
focusing event (DeLeo, 2015; DeLeo, 2018). For example, unlike the 2005 avian influenza case 
described by Birkland, a number of recent public health crises, including the 2009 swine influ-
enza pandemic and the 2014 Ebola epidemic, escalated relatively quickly, sickening and killing 
thousands of people in a matter of months. This revelation of harms is thus much more akin to 
the dramatic shock caused by a sudden-onset event than the long, drawn-out process typically 
associated with the gradual accumulation of indicators (see also DeLeo, 2021). 
Focusing Events, Issue Attention and Agenda Change
Focusing events are important in the policy process because they can open windows of oppor-
tunity for elevating issues onto the agenda. Kingdon (2003) suggests that disasters have the 
ability to “simply bowl over everything standing in the way of prominence on the agenda” (p. 
96). Birkland’s notion of potential focusing events tempers this expectation by showing that 
many disasters fail to trigger the type of robust mobilization typically associated with agenda 
change and that, in any case, we cannot know a priori whether an event will have very much 
“focal” power. While most disasters trigger an uptick in negative media and policymaker at-
tention, agenda change occurs when events induce government to explore potential actions in 
the face of the policy failures revealed by the event. Moreover, research suggests that single, 
one-off events tend not to open windows of opportunity (O’Donovan, 2017). Instead, windows 
open due to an accumulation of experience with the problems revealed by events over time. 
The accumulated experience of nearby jurisdictions may also influence policy change during 
relatively brief windows of time (O’Donovan, 2017). 
However, some conditions can make focusing events more powerful and influential than other 
events. First, the suddenness of an event, and concomitant claims that the event was unfore-
seeable, are consistently influential. By moving the harms of an event from the realm of the 
foreseeable — or, more to the point, the preventable — to the realm of the unexpected, the 
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policy actors responsible for addressing the problems raised by a focusing event can shift cul-
pability from human frailty to chance occurrence (Stone, 1989). Second, the severity or wide-
spread nature of an event can also catalyze policy change, either out of necessity or due to 
lessons learned from the event (Crow et al., 2019). Third, the framing of the issues revealed by 
the event helps to define the underlying problems that exist, thereby narrowing the scope of 
possible policy solutions (Lawlor & Crow, 2018; Crow et al., 2016; Wolfe et al., 2013; `t Hart 
& Tindall, 2009; Lawrence & Birkland, 2004). Finally, the institutional arrangements within a 
policy domain are important for issue attention. Agency characteristics, the statutory or regu-
latory regime in place, and the extent to which the policy problem is discrete or spans several 
policy areas, can be highly influential in shaping issue attention within the domain (May et al., 
2009; May et al., 2008).   
Focusing Events and Policy Change
Focusing events can help to induce agenda change; however, not all events promote what we 
might normatively believe to be the “correct” kind of policy change. For example, school shoot-
ings focus attention and capture agenda space but do not often lead to policy change. This is 
because, for some highly conflictual policy issues, increased attention to the problem on the 
agenda may mean that policy entrepreneurs seek to flood the policy debate with their preferred 
construction of the problem and its solutions in an effort to deny agenda space to other actors 
(Wolfe et al., 2013; Pralle, 2009; Wheeldon & McBrien, 2015; Lawrence & Birkland, 2004). 
Birkland’s conception of focusing events shares similarities with Anthony Downs’s Issue-At-
tention cycle (1972), in which an event causes a very sudden increase in concern about a prob-
lem, followed by a decline in interest in the problem as the benefits and the costs of potential 
solutions become manifest while the “alarmed discovery” of the problem wanes over time. 
Unlike Downs, however, Birkland’s conception of focusing events indicates that events can 
yield policy change that creates long-term institutional and attitudinal change in relation to 
public problems. In the case of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the focusing event overcame a lengthy 
legislative deadlock and led to the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which substan-
tially changed prevention and response policy regarding oil spills, while the September 11 at-
tacks led, among other things, to significant changes in the aviation security system worldwide 
(Birkland, 2004). 
As focusing events reveal policy failure, they can prompt learning about why the event hap-
pened, what can be done to respond to it, and what can be done to prevent its recurrence (Mc-
Connell, 2010a). Policy learning describes the process through which policymakers apply new 
information and ideas to policy decisions and is one of the most important pathways to policy 
change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; May, 1992). Disasters reveal deficiencies in existing 
policy regimes, in turn providing an opportunity for the government to reexamine old laws and 
enact changes to mitigate risk (Birkland, 2006; Albright, 2011; Albright & Crow, 2021; Crow & 
Albright, 2019; O’Donovan, 2017; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013). 
There are various types of post-event learning (May, 1992). Instrumental learning focuses on 
the utility of existing policy instruments or the tools used to achieve program objectives. So-
cial learning focuses not on the intricacies of policy design, but on the way in which problems 
are framed and defined and the underlying causes of problems. Between these two are various 
types of learning that can lead to changes in organizations, policies, and strategies used to ac-
complish policy goals (May, 1992; Birkland, 2006; O’Donovan, 2017). It is important to note, 
however, that the post-event enactment of new legislation is not evidence of instrumental or 
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social learning. Many policies do little more than reinforce the status quo by simply funneling 
additional funding into existing institutions or programs without closely evaluating the sub-
stantive effects of existing policy (Birkland, 2004; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). The time ho-
rizon for policy change is, however, limited to fairly short windows of opportunity, namely the 
period when the public and media are focused on the disaster and on recovery from the event. 
Data and Methods
To what extent is COVID-19 a focusing event? To assess this question, we use a mixed-meth-
ods design, combining quantitative analysis of the emerging-disease policy domain with a case 
analysis of COVID-19 policymaking in the U.S. Our quantitative analysis examines the infec-
tious-disease policy domain from 1995 through the third quarter of 2020. We use this span of 
time because policy dynamics often take a decade or more to manifest and also to reflect the 
effects of exogenous events on government agendas (Sabatier, 1988). We estimate the effect 
that prominent infectious-disease outbreaks during that time, including COVID-19, influenza, 
Ebola, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), had on the U.S. congressional agenda 
and on the media agenda, as measured by mentions in the Congressional Record and the New 
York Times. We model COVID-19 not as a stand-alone event, but as one of a number of events 
influencing the larger emerging-disease domain over the last 25 years. This approach prevents 
us from narrowly focusing on the idiosyncrasies of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has not 
yet run its course. Our approach also provides several points of comparative data. The models 
use count data, so we rely on negative binomial analysis to estimate the effect of disease cases 
on the media and congressional agendas. Negative binomial regression has been previously 
used by scholars examining the relationship between public health issues and agenda setting 
(DeLeo, 2018; see also Delshad, 2012). 
Our qualitative case analysis examines the similarities and differences between COVID-19 
policymaking and Birkland’s conceptualization of focusing events. An exploratory case-study 
approach of this nature is appropriate given the theoretical goals of this analysis (Yin, 2017). 
The quantitative model detects fairly broad patterns of issue attention and agenda change, 
while the case study specifically examines the process through which COVID-19 emerged as a 
political issue, triggered policy change, and potentially induced learning. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the variables in the regression analysis. We model two depend-
ent variables. The first dependent variable, media change, captures the number of mentions in 
news stories of COVID-19, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), avian influenza, swine 
influenza, and Ebola, in the New York Times from 1995 through August 15, 2020. The data were 
gathered by searching the LexisNexis University database for the terms “COVID-19,” “SARS,” 
“avian influenza,” “swine flu,” and “Ebola” in the headlines and lead paragraphs of stories pub-
lished in the New York Times, a newspaper of record in the United States and therefore a useful 
measure of media attention paid to major national issues and their influence on other media 
reporting (Weaver et al., 2004).
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Table 1: Variable Summary
Name Description Values Source
Dependent Variables












COVID-19 Number of COVID-19 
human cases worldwide




SARS Number of SARS human 
cases




Ebola 2014 Number of human cases 
resulting from the 2014 
Ebola epidemic




Ebola Number of human Ebola 
cases, not including the 
2014 epidemic




Avian influenza Number of human H5N1 
avian influenza cases 




Swine influenza Number of human H1N1 
swine influenza cases




Source : The Authors
The second dependent variable, agenda change, applies the same search string used to gather 
New York Times data but measures the number of times that emerging diseases were entered 
in the Congressional Record. A running record of all the statements made on the floor of the 
United States Congress, the Congressional Record is a widely used proxy for agenda change. 
Because Congress takes various recesses over the course of a given legislative session, both 
agenda change and media change are measured by quarter-year (every three months), yielding 
103 quarters to analyze in the dataset.
Independent variables account for the number of global cases resulting from six of the larg-
est and most significant novel-disease outbreaks since 1995. Our disease data come from the 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) Situational Update Reports, which provide detailed ac-
counts of the global incidences of various novel diseases. Situational Update Reports are avail-
able on the WHO website. Independent variables are count data and are measured quarterly. 
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We include two variables measuring outbreaks of the novel coronavirus, COVID-19, the pri-
mary focus of this study, and SARS. Coronaviruses denote a diverse family of viruses that range 
in severity from the common cold to serious and often life-threatening complications such 
as respiratory distress. Because humans have no history of exposure to novel coronaviruses, 
and therefore little or no immunity, these viruses are particularly deadly. COVID-19 was first 
identified in China in December 2019. By March 2020, the WHO declared the outbreak a pan-
demic, as the disease resulted in thousands of cases worldwide. As of this writing, COVID-19 is 
estimated to have made more than 107 million individuals sick, killing more than 2.3 million 
of them. SARS made more than 8,000 people sick worldwide between November 2002 and May 
2004. SARS was an extraordinarily lethal disease, and despite the lower disease incidence, it 
killed more than 770 people.   
We include two variables measuring outbreaks of novel influenza, avian influenza and swine in-
fluenza. Novel influenza is a classification used to describe influenza viruses that cause human 
cases but are different from seasonal flu, which means that humans often lack immunity. The 
first pandemic influenza scare came in 2003 following the outbreak of a novel strain of H5N1 
avian influenza in Southeast Asia. The outbreak was contained, never infecting more than 120 
people a year. In contrast, the 2009 H1N1 swine influenza, which originated in Mexico, quickly 
spiraled into a pandemic that made hundreds of thousands of people sick worldwide.  
Finally, we include two variables measuring outbreaks of Ebola, Ebola and Ebola 2014. Ebola 
is a lethal form of viral hemorrhagic fever that infects both humans and primates. While the 
first outbreak occurred in 1976, Ebola caused a string of outbreaks across Africa in the 1990s 
and 2000s. The variable Ebola captures the case counts associated with these intermittent out-
breaks from 1995 through the third quarter of 2020 excluding the 2014 Ebola epidemic. These 
outbreaks collectively resulted in more than 5,000 human cases. We treat the Ebola 2014 epi-
demic as a separate event because it resulted in nearly six times the number of cases as the 
previous outbreaks, including a few cases in the U.S. and Europe. 
Analysis
COVID-19 and Agenda Change
We begin our analysis by estimating a baseline model to capture the agenda effect of all the 
emerging diseases described above — except for COVID-19 — on the media and congressional 
agenda. We created a variable combining the number of cases associated with SARS, avian in-
fluenza, swine influenza, the 2014 Ebola epidemic, and the various Ebola outbreaks of the 
1990s and 2000s. To ease interpretation, we transformed this variable to a z-score. Our base-
line model indicates that every one-standard deviation increase in the number of emerging-
disease cases (roughly 39,513 cases) results in an approximate 26% increase in the number 
of Congressional Record entries and a 48% increase in the number of stories published in the 
New York Times.
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Table 2: Agenda Change and Novel Diseases






Ebola 2014 .119(.0924) .394(.1704)**
Ebola .052(.0934) .004(.1338)
Avian Influenza .318(.1175)*** .146(.1687)




Deviance goodness of fit (value/df) 1.233 1.328
Log likelihood -438.652 -494.876
Chi-square likelihood ratio 70.946 475.709
Note: Estimated coefficients are z-scores. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; two-sided test of significance
Source: The Authors
Given the baseline model characteristics, Table 2 adds COVID-19 and treats avian influenza, 
swine influenza, SARS, Ebola 2014, and Ebola as discrete events. Deviance goodness-of-fit 
tests are used to assess how well observed data fit the model. Scores closer to “1” indicate a 
better model fit.  Deviance goodness-of-fit testing for both the Congressional Record (goodness-
of-fit=1.233), as well as the New York Times models (goodness-of-fit=1.328), suggest a strong 
fit. Moreover, chi-square likelihood ratios for the Congressional Record model (chi-square likeli-
hood ratio=70.946) and the New York Times model (chi-square likelihood ratio=475.709) indi-
cate that our models are a significant improvement over the null. 
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We once again transform independent variables to z-scores to help ease the interpretation of 
the models. Model 1 indicates that COVID-19 had a dramatic and statistically significant effect 
on the Congressional Record. Specifically, every one-standard deviation increase in COVID-19 
cases (roughly 1,729,032 cases) resulted in an almost 70% increase in Congressional Record en-
tries. In comparison, a one-standard deviation increase in SARS cases (roughly 685 cases) and 
avian influenza cases (roughly 8 cases), the only other statistically significant predictors in 
Model 1, resulted in 16% and 32% increases in Congressional Record entries, respectively. 
Model 2 indicates that novel-disease outbreaks have an even greater effect on the media agen-
da; however, COVID-19 stands out. Every one-standard deviation increase in the number of 
COVID-19 cases results in a more than 300% increase in New York Times stories. The other 
statistically significant predictors in our model, the 2014 Ebola epidemic and SARS, generated 
modest upticks in attention but ultimately paled in comparison to COVID-19. Specifically, a 
one-standard deviation increase in Ebola 2014 cases (roughly 1,526 cases) results in a 39% 
increase in New York Times stories, whereas a one-standard deviation increase in SARS cases 
results in a 32% increase in media attention. 
Of course, these results should be interpreted with caution because the estimates are based 
on nine months of COVID-19 data. It is plausible that issue attention will wane in the months 
ahead, especially if the number of cases drops. However, the sheer magnitude of COVID-19’s 
impact on the government and media suggests that the pandemic will continue to have a pro-
found effect on issue attention, especially when compared with previous outbreaks. These re-
sults are especially striking because previous research suggests that avian influenza and Ebola 
triggered fairly robust policy change at the congressional level and were widely considered wa-
tershed events in the public health domain (DeLeo, 2018).  
COVID-19 Through the Lens of Focusing Event Theory
The following section assesses the extent to which the characteristics of the current COVID-19 
crisis match Birkland’s (1997) definition of a focusing event as being: (1) sudden and relatively 
rare; (2) harmful or revealing possible future harms; (3) confined to a geographical area; and 
(4) known to policymakers and the public simultaneously. Table 3 suggests that COVID-19 is 
different from the classic conceptualization of focusing events. First, although COVID-19 is 
undoubtedly a serious event, it cannot be characterized as sudden, at least from the perspec-
tive of U.S. policymakers. The disease was first identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 
and it was not until late January 2020 that the WHO classified the outbreak as a Public Health 
Emergency. On January 20, 2020, nearly a month after the disease was identified in China, 
the U.S. reported its first case of COVID-19 (Holshue et al. 2020). The first known instances 
of community spread in the U.S. occurred in late February 2020 (CDC COVID-19 Response 
Team et al., 2020). Although the COVID-19 pandemic escalated quickly, the event was neither 
relatively sudden nor unexpected in the way that a hurricane is (providing only a few days of 
lead time for preparation), or an earthquake or plane crash, which happen with no warning. 
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Table 3: Focusing Events and COVID-19
Focusing Events COVID-19 Features of COVID-19
Sudden, relatively rare Yes/No Relatively rare, but not sudden
Harmful and reveals future harms Yes Harmful and revealed future harms
Concentrated geographic area No Global in scope
Known to policymakers and public 
simultaneously
No Policymakers were aware before 
public
Source: The Authors
Second, the virus is not concentrated in a specific geographical area. By definition, a pandemic 
is “an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international bounda-
ries and usually affecting a large number of people” (Kelly, 2011, p. 540). COVID-19 has caused 
widespread illness and has stifled the global economy, making it a far different type of disaster 
than the natural and man-made incidents examined in the focusing events literature. It is a 
global pandemic, although the harms are distributed unevenly across different geographical 
regions of the world and the U.S. Indeed, uneven effects are being observed within the U.S. 
The effects of the novel coronavirus are particularly severe for members of vulnerable popula-
tions, specifically Black American, Hispanics, Native Americans, and the elderly (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2020). 
Third, COVID-19 was not known to policymakers and the public simultaneously. Chinese public 
health officials reported the outbreak of a cluster of respiratory infections on December 31, 
2019. Less than a week later, the cluster was confirmed as being caused by a novel coronavirus 
(Patel & Jernigan, 2020). Media reports indicating the outbreak of a virus in China causing 
flu-like symptoms did not appear in the New York Times until January 6, 2020 (Wee & Wang, 
2020). On January 4, 2020, the Food and Drug Administration issued emergency protocols for 
testing and on January 7, 2020 the CDC activated its Incident Management Structure to guide 
its response (Patel & Jernigan, 2020). This indicates that public health officials were aware of 
the virus at least a week before the general public was. Widespread media coverage of the vi-
rus did not begin until February and March, which means that most Americans were likely to 
have been unconcerned with the virus until that point. Finally, recent reporting suggests that 
President Donald Trump knew about the seriousness of the pandemic relatively early in the U.S 
outbreak, but played down the severity of the virus, further underscoring information asym-
metries between elites and the general public (Goldberg, 2020; Gregorian, 2020). 
The single aspect of the crisis that dovetails with Birkland’s definition of a focusing event is the 
way in which it reveals harms. COVID-19 revealed the risk of infection and, as the pandemic 
endures, it continues to reveal additional harms. Indeed, as noted throughout, COVID-19 rep-
resents one of the greatest public health crises in modern history. 
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COVID-19 and Policy Change 
COVID-19 bowled over the media and policy agendas in early 2020 and shares some similarities 
and differences with the classic definition of a focusing event. But has this attention translated 
into policy change? Table 4 summarizes the eleven items of legislation related to COVID-19 
enacted by the U.S. Congress from the start of the pandemic in March 2020 to the third quarter 
of 2020. The pandemic has clearly opened a policy window. From a $2 trillion-dollar economic 
relief program to an $8.3 billion public health response initiative, Congress enacted a series of 
sweeping policies in response to the crisis. This response spanned multiple policy domains in 
addition to public health, including the economy, education, social welfare, and law enforce-
ment. May and Jochim coined the term “policy regimes” to describe this boundary-spanning 
nature of disasters, in which there is “the constellation of ideas, institutional arrangements, 
and interests that are involved in addressing policy problems” (2013, p. 426). COVID-19 ap-
pears to fit the mold of a boundary-spanning issue. It is, therefore, unsurprising that policy 
change in Congress has spanned multiple jurisdictional and issue areas.  
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116-128
A bill to authorize 
the Secretary of 




to distance learning 
by reason of 
emergencies and 
health-related 
situations in the 














CARES Act Authorizes $2 trillion 
to address COVID-19 
and its economic 
fallout, including cash 
relief to individual 
citizens, loan 
programs for small 
businesses, support 
for hospitals, as well 
as various other 











funding for small 
business loans, health 










related to the 
forgiveness of loans 
made to small 







1 — In both of these bills, the Senate used an unrelated bill that had already passed the House in 2019, amended it and 
sent it back to the House to final approval in order to expedite passage of the legislation.
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116-147
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for other purposes.
Extends the application 
period for the Paycheck 
Protection Program 
established to support 




Emergency Aid for 
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cans Affected by 
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countries due to a crisis 
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Responders Act of 
2020
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Benefits Program (PSOB) 
to public safety officers 
(e.g., law enforcement 
officers) and survivors of 
public safety officers who 
die or become injured as 
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stop movement orders 
in response to a local, 
national, or global 






Despite these important pieces of legislation, closer analysis suggests that the COVID-19 pan-
demic has yet to result in the type of informed lesson learning needed to truly reconfigure sub-
system dynamics and create policy change. The legislation enacted and detailed in Table 4 was 
intended to mitigate the effects of the pandemic on public health, the economy, and education 
in near real time. All the bills enacted focus on economic stimulus, on new programs to aid in 
coronavirus testing or care, and on providing additional COVID-19-related flexibility to pro-
grams that already exist, which typically have strict guidelines governing spending or program 
limits. One exception to this pattern is the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) modifications 
made during June and July 2020 (PL 116-142). Once enacted into law in March 2020, Con-
gress received a significant volume of feedback from constituent small businesses about the 
effectiveness of the PPP, its implementation, and the rule that limited the overall loan amount 
that small businesses could direct towards overheads versus staff salary in order to qualify 
for loan forgiveness. Based on this feedback, the Small Business Committee in the U.S. House 
modified requirements to provide the needed flexibility (PL 116-147). 
This type of legislative response can be described as instrumental learning, or lesson drawing, 
where policy instruments are modified in response to new information (May, 1992; Birkland, 
2004). As previously noted, the COVID-19 legislation passed by the U.S. Congress does not 
seek to amend or alter existing policies and institutions in order to prevent a similar crisis from 
happening again in the future. The ways in which Congress has adapted to conduct business 
remotely (Grisales, 2020) are evidence of government learning, in which government learns 
how to improve procedures and processes (Howlett, 2012; McConnell, 2010b). These recom-
mendations were made after 9/11 by the Continuity of Government Commission and are rou-
tinely brought up by proponents of congressional reform (Ornstein 2020), so the accumulation 
of knowledge from multiple experiences may also be important to the changes made during 
COVID-19.
In addition to the ongoing nature of the crisis, there are a number of ways that it has affected 
the institution of Congress itself, which may prevent or delay government, organizational, or 
social learning. This sort of learning would be necessary for major policy change that would 
result in restructuring or re-envisioning government agencies, programs, and goals to prevent 
future similar crises. Like most Americans, Members of Congress worked remotely from home 
between March and June 2020. Normally, congressional business would require near-weekly 
trips to Washington, D.C. to vote and to hold hearings. In this three-month timespan, there 
were three series of votes that focused entirely on COVID-19 legislation. All other legislative 
business was moved off the calendar and delayed until late 2020. In late June, mid-July, and 
September, Congress returned for modified shortened vote weeks, which focused primarily on 
must-pass legislation such as the federal budget. 
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In May 2020, the House of Representatives voted to allow a number of rule changes so that the 
chamber could continue its work despite the COVID-19 crisis. Remote hearings were allowed, 
along with a modified proxy-voting process (Grisales, 2020). This meant that most business 
during the entirety of 2020 was done in a modified format. Hearings were conducted par-
tially via remote technology, congressional office buildings were mostly vacant as staff worked 
remotely, caucus meetings and other formal and informal meetings were cancelled or took 
place remotely, and votes were held in small groups alphabetically instead of as a full chamber 
(Tully-McManus, 2020). This last change delayed the business of Congress because votes took 
much longer (being conducted over hours, rather than in 5- or 15-minute segments, as small 
groups of Representatives came to the chamber briefly to cast their votes). Together, these 
rule changes meant that the networking and relationship-building that takes place through 
both formal and informal means among Members of Congress was more difficult during 2020. 
These avenues are one important mechanism through which the uptake of new information, 
exchange of ideas, and learning can take place. While still to be determined, these changes may 
influence the speed and ability of Congress to learn from the COVID-19 crisis. 
Because COVID-19 remains a vexing public health crisis, Congress has yet to engage in the type 
of sustained lesson-learning necessary for major policy change. COVID-19 bowled over the en-
tire agenda, in spite of competition for attention during the pandemic from other issues such 
as race relations and police power, natural disasters, and the nomination of a U.S. Supreme 
Court justice. The dominance of COVID-19 on the policy agenda speaks to the severity of the 
problem and to the focal power of the event over its duration.     
During the Disaster: Refining the Concept of Focusing Events 
The COVID-19 pandemic raises a number of important theoretical challenges to policy process 
theory and, in particular, to research on focusing events. On the one hand, it lacks many of the 
characteristics used to describe focusing events. It was neither sudden nor unexpected. It is not 
isolated to a specific geographical area, but is global in scope. Nor has it been isolated within a 
community of interest. Moreover, it appears that policymakers in the U.S. were well aware of 
the virus — and its lethality — weeks, if not months, before the general public. On the other 
hand, it reshaped the congressional and media agendas in much the same way as a focusing 
event, dominating issue attention since March 2020. And although Congress has yet to pass 
the sort of sweeping reforms needed to avert another pandemic in the future, this pandemic 
has resulted in a windfall of legislation and spending to help to mitigate the devastating effects 
of the virus on public health and the economy. 
The challenge of characterizing COVID-19 stems from the fact that indicators and focusing 
events are said to align along a dichotomy, with indicators measuring gradually deteriorating 
issues and focusing events measuring sudden events. But this research, set in the context of 
previous work on focusing events and problem indicators, suggests that these two drivers of 
agenda change may fall more on a continuum. Echoing previous research (DeLeo, 2018), we ar-
gue that, when indicators accumulate rapidly, they can have a catalytic effect on media and pol-
icymaker attention paid to previously ignored issues. Moreover, studies of aggregate focusing 
events suggest that an accumulation of several focusing events over time leads to policy change 
(O’Donovan, 2017). When viewed as a whole, the duration of the effects of a policy problem, 
whether in more durable indicators or in repeated focusing events, seems to be an important 
theme in the literature, magnified by the policy implications of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
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We propose a two-by-two typology for organizing scholarly thinking about indicators, events, 
and their effect on the trajectory of agenda setting, policy change, and learning (Figure 1). 
The x-axis of Figure 1 describes the rate of indicator accumulation or the speed at which cases or 
other indicators of a problem amass and multiply. Consistent with previous research (Birkland 
2006; DeLeo, 2018), we assume that the rate of accumulation can vary from gradual, which 
refers to situations where there is small to modest change in the number of indicators over a 
prolonged period of time (several more months or even years), to rapid accumulation, which 
refers to sizable changes in the number of indicators over a short period of time (weeks to a 
few months). We also add a dimension accounting for the duration of the effects of an event, de-
picted on the y-axis of Figure 1. Here we differentiate between short-duration events, referring 
to events that only last for a few weeks to a couple of months, to long-duration events, which 
refer to events that linger for several months to more than a year.  
Policy process theory emphasizes that all problems, including disasters, are to some extent 
socially constructed, so variation in the rate of accumulation and duration of an event will 
likely be somewhat contextual (Birkland, 2006; Kingdon, 2003). The public health domain’s 
differentiation between disease outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics provides a useful analog. 
An outbreak is a greater than expected number of disease cases. An epidemic refers to a larger 
outbreak typically confined to a particular geographical area. A pandemic refers to a global 
disease outbreak. There is no definitive threshold used to determine whether a disease event 
constitutes an outbreak, an epidemic, or a pandemic. Rather, these categories reflect  the size 
and scope of the disease event and a disease’s novelty, which helps to determine whether an 
event deviates from our expectations of normal transmission within a community. 











Short Duration, Rapid Accumulation 
(SARS)
Long Duration, Rapid Accumulation 
(COVID-19, Swine influenza, Ebola'14)
Short Duration, Gradual Accumulation 
(Ebola outbreaks)
Long Duration, Gradual Accumulation 
(Avian influenza, MERS)
Rate of indicator Accumulation
Source: The Authors
We are presented with four distinct contexts for assessing the effect of indicators and focusing 
events on agenda setting, policy change, and lesson learning. Short-duration, gradual-accumu-
lation events (lower left panel) typically describe novel disease outbreaks that fail to capture 
policymaker attention, such as the various Ebola outbreaks of the 1990s and 2000s. Indicators 
suggested a potential problem, but they rarely meet the critical mass needed to trigger wide-
spread concern, at least among U.S. policymakers. These events are typically confined to a very 
specific geographical area and are therefore less likely to drive agenda setting, let alone the type 
of informed lesson learning needed to trigger substantive policy change. 
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Long-duration, gradual-accumulation events (lower right panel) also see a gradual and modest 
accumulation of indicators; however, in this instance, the event lingers for an extended period. 
The avian influenza outbreak, for example, lasted for several years, but, because the virus never 
mutated into an airborne strain, it failed to trigger a global pandemic. This pattern lends itself 
to the indicator-driven policy process described by Birkland (2006) and others (DeLeo, 2018; 
DeLeo, 2021). Because cases accumulate slowly, policymakers are presented with an opportu-
nity to develop preparedness or pre-event policymaking, a testament to the fact that indica-
tors point to the possibility of a larger problem on the horizon (DeLeo, 2018; DeLeo, 2021). 
Previous research implies that these conditions can lead instrumental policy learning as most 
pre-event policy changes seek to prepare for the emerging hazard rather than make systemic 
changes to avoid such risks. For example, the specter of an avian influenza pandemic caused 
policymakers to revisit organizational structures used to manage public health emergencies, as 
well as key liability laws governing vaccine creation and distribution (DeLeo, 2018).
Short-duration, rapid-accumulation events (upper left panel) are marked by a sudden, but rela-
tively short-lived, spike in indicators. This is the typical focusing event pattern observed in 
most natural disasters or terrorist events studied in the disaster policy literature. It is also 
found in numerous public health cases, such as the 2003 SARS outbreak where a sharp up-
tick in cases occurred between November and March; however, this incident had been mostly 
contained by early spring. Although we did not assess whether SARS facilitated policy change, 
our quantitative analysis shows that SARS had a considerable impact on both the media and 
congressional agendas as it was the only statistically significant variable in both models aside 
from COVID-19. We would not, however, expect to see considerable policy learning in these 
instances since they rapidly fade from the institutional agenda. The policy changes that take 
place in these cases are more likely to fall in the instrumental, or even mimicking, categories.
Finally, and most important for this study, rapid-accumulation, long-duration events (upper 
right panel) are marked by a rapid and significant accumulation of indicators that create a 
persistent crisis situation extending over a period of months to years, such as COVID-19. As 
COVID-19 cases accumulate, we move from an issue-attention process driven by indicators to 
one driven by something that is conceptualized by policymakers and the public as a singular 
event. In the context of COVID-19, public attention does not appear to scrutinize individual 
cases or case counts as they mount in one state and then another. Instead, milestones seem to 
garner more attention — 100,000 cases, 1,000,000 cases, 100,000 deaths and so on. Not only 
do these types of events bowl their way onto the policy agenda, but the COVID-19 pandemic 
suggests that they also facilitate multiple windows of opportunity. Because these events lin-
ger for an extended period of time, they often require the enactment of policies that alleviate 
suffering and support the various government institutions responding to the crisis. In many 
respects, this type of policy is akin to disaster relief projects that funnel resources into hazard-
stricken areas. 
While these types of activities during disaster are no doubt important, they differ from the type 
of informed lesson learning that can occur in the aftermath of other types of disasters. Oth-
ers have observed a similar phenomenon during the swine influenza pandemic, noting that, 
while Congress devoted a considerable amount of time to discussing and debating the Obama 
Administration’s response to the crisis, most of the policy enacted during this period centered 
on funding vaccine production and on other vaccines (DeLeo, 2015). Still, our modelling sug-
gests that COVID-19 is unlike any public crisis in decades, so it is likely that, once the pandemic 
recedes, Congress will reform the nation’s public health infrastructure. These changes could 
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result in increasing investments in public health preparedness, strengthening the response 
capabilities of states, re-envisioning the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s role in col-
lecting and disseminating public health information, or other substantive reforms equivalent 
to the institutional and policy changes enacted after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. 
Of course, where an issue sits on our typology can change over time. Indicator change is dy-
namic so an event — and especially a disease outbreak — can quickly transition from several 
years of gradual accumulation to rapid accumulation at a moment’s notice. This means that our 
typology encompasses policymaking before, during and after a disaster, although our focus 
here is on policymaking during the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, it is important to note that 
neither indicator accumulation nor the duration of an event are sufficient catalysts for policy 
change. Our typology is intended to help to organize thinking about the context of agenda set-
ting, policy change, and learning; however, whether or not policymakers choose to act on an 
issue is ultimately a political question. Disasters — be they tornadoes, earthquakes, or disease 
outbreaks — have the potential to trigger issue attention and agenda setting, but change is 
never guaranteed (Birkland, 1997).
Conclusion
Our study represents a first attempt to assess systematically the policymaking implications of 
the COVID-19 pandemic through the lens of focusing event theory. The COVID-19 pandemic 
represents a fluid and evolving situation. We are, as the title suggests, analyzing policymaking 
during disaster. As such, key findings, particularly with respect to the scope of policy learning, 
need to be revisited in the months and years ahead as testament to the inherent challenges as-
sociated with doing policy process research in near real time (Weible et al., 2020).
Our typology necessitates closer analysis since our primary focus in this paper is on rapid-ac-
cumulation, long-duration events. Future research should continue to sharpen and refine our 
definitions of duration and rate of accumulation while applying our typology outside the U.S. 
For example, to what extent does proximity to a problem dictate the relative influence of indi-
cator change? China’s experience of managing COVID-19, as well as H5N1 avian influenza, is 
likely to be far different from that of the U.S. since both diseases originated within its borders. 
Above all else, our study of COVID-19 shows that the timing and duration of a crisis matter 
(DeLeo, 2015). This finding is important for two reasons. First, we show that enduring cri-
ses can open multiple windows of opportunity to address different, boundary-spanning policy 
problems revealed by the event over time. Future research should consider the extent to which 
this dynamic occurs in others hazards, including the governance of climate change and perhaps 
other novel disease outbreaks.  
Second, our findings help to shift the theoretical understanding and empirical investigation of 
focusing events to account for longer-duration events, such as pandemics, droughts, sea-level 
rise, or economic recessions, to allow for the aggregation of events and for potential learning 
along the way that can occur as a result. More specifically, our typology suggests the need 
to move away from framing indicators (or information) and focusing events (or exogenous 
shocks) as discrete concepts. Instead, we suggest that they align along a continuum in that 
emergent hazards can, across time, evolve into large-scale crises that embody many of the key 
characteristics ascribed to focusing events. This finding suggests that scholars across the policy 
sciences should consider the time during a disaster as an important factor for policy change, 
especially within the context of slower-onset, longer-duration events.
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